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Abstract

Internationally, there are varying laws regarding physician-assisted suicide (PAS) and
active euthanasia. In the United States, PAS is legal in Right to Die states like Oregon. These
states necessitate that patients seeking PAS be terminally ill, often with 6 months or less left to
live. There are also countries that allow for active euthanasia, with the majority of these
countries also requiring that the patient be terminally ill. Belgium and the Netherlands are two
countries that do not necessitate terminal illness in their criteria, but instead utilize the category
of unbearable or constant suffering, which has, controversially, led to individuals being granted
active euthanasia for existential and psychological suffering due to non-terminal illness,
including mental illnesses. This essay contains a literature survey that examines key arguments
from both the 1970s and 2000s to highlight the emergence of two distinctive branches in the
PAS/active, voluntary euthanasia debate. These distinctive models of criteria diverge in the
balance between autonomy and humanitarian-relief of suffering, as well as the justification for
the termination of life as facilitated by medical doctors, as demonstrated in Oregon and The
Netherlands and Belgium. Therefore, Right to Die models of PAS exercised in states such as
Oregon should not be extended to scenarios where the patient is not terminally ill without major
reconstruction.

Criteria for Active Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide

In the United States, active euthanasia is illegal and physician-assisted suicide (PAS) is
legal in a handful of states, namely California, Colorado, Montana, Oregon, Vermont, and
Washington. There are other states where PAS is not legal but is also not criminalized, such as
North Carolina and Massachusetts. Though active euthanasia is currently out of the picture in the
U.S, internationally, active, voluntary euthanasia is legal in Belgium, Colombia, Japan,
Luxembourg, and The Netherlands (“Euthanasia Regulations Around the World”). An additional
variable within the landscape of permitting or denying a patient’s request to die that is often
taken for granted in philosophical and bioethical discourse is the attached criteria. While Right to
Die states like Oregon require that an individual be diagnosed with a terminal illness to qualify
for PAS, the Netherlands and Belgium are two countries that do not necessitate terminal illness,
but instead utilize the category of unbearable or constant suffering, which is not limited to the
suffering produced by a terminal illness or even physical suffering. This language has led to the
controversial precedent in both countries for granting euthanasia to individuals who are
existentially depressed or mentally ill. This begs the question, which scenarios qualify for the
termination of a patient’s life? Do only certain kinds of illness or suffering warrant PAS and/or
active euthanasia. Is the sustained desire not to live sufficient?
Some individuals and groups who are opposed to the act of euthanizing patients may use
these northwestern European countries to construct slippery slope arguments against the
legalization of any process which supports a patient in actively ending their life. But when
considering the data on regions that practice both PAS and active euthanasia, it is clear that this

is a minority development and that there is not an established causative relationship between the
two outcomes. Yet, what is less readily apparent is how the relevant philosophical and bioethical
literature corresponds to the two different approaches and justifications of PAS and active
euthanasia.
This essay will survey key literature related to PAS and active euthanasia to elucidate the
diverging intellectual and ethical investments, values, and priorities within the larger
discourse, demonstrated by the diverging criteria for euthanasia in Oregon, a PAS-state requiring
terminal illness with 6 months or less to live, as well as the Netherlands and Belgium, two
countries with the benchmark of constant and unbearable suffering. This essay will also aim to
demonstrate the emergence of two distinctive branches in the PAS/active, voluntary euthanasia
debate. These distinctive models of criteria diverge in the balance between autonomy and
humanitarian-relief of suffering, as well as the justification for termination of life facilitated by
medical doctors, as demonstrated in Oregon and The Netherlands and Belgium.
The publication dates of the articles surveyed will range from dated to contemporary, so
as to highlight any trends, shifts, or pattern in the literature. This essay will be operating under
the ethical position that active euthanasia vs. PAS does not carry significant moral distinction but
that any situation where PAS would be morally justified, active (voluntary) euthanasia would be
similarly justified. The essay will be focused on the diverging endorsed criteria for empowering
a patient to actively end their life, demonstrated by Oregon and The Netherlands/Belgium.
Therefore, Right to Die models of PAS exercised in states such as Oregon should not be
extended to scenarios where the patient is not terminally ill without major reconstruction.

Terminology and History:
Physician-assisted suicide (PAS) is the process by which a patient takes their own life
with the assistance of a physician. This is often carried out by the prescription of a lethal dose of
drugs. Euthanasia also involves the intentional termination of a life but is perpetuated by another
party instead of merely assisted by one. In addition, there are the categories of 1.) involuntary
and voluntary euthanasia and 2.) active and passive euthanasia. Euthanasia is voluntary or
involuntary depending upon if the individual being euthanized consents. For legal and medical
purposes, voluntary euthanasia would be the most pertinent form, but cases where a patient is
unable to give consent due to diminishing cognition and consciousness are also commonly
debated.
A physician administering a lethal dose of drugs would be a classic example of active
euthanasia because the physician is directly terminating a life. Passive euthanasia, conversely,
involves indirect means of ending a patient’s life, such as discontinuing life-saving treatment. As
one could imagine, these sub-categories of orchestrating death combine in a myriad of ways and
creates scenarios with unique ethical and legal considerations. Philosophical and bioethical
discourse has historically wrestled with these variables, arguing for which set of conditions best
allows for the ethical termination of a patient’s life, yet none of these distinctions relate directly
to question of criteria.
In the United States, every state that has legalized PAS has set the parameter of terminalillness around a reasonably proximal and foreseeable death, often with the additional, specific
criteria of six or less months to live. It does not follow that only PAS states/nation will
necessarily have the requirement of terminal illness, or that, hypothetically, a PAS state/nation
could not adopt a suffering rather than terminally-ill centered model. In the five countries which

permit voluntary, active euthanasia, Japan and Colombia necessitate the presence of a terminal
illness. Luxembourg does not require terminal illness but does require that the suffering be a
result of injury or physical death disease.
Conversely, Belgium and the Netherlands’ criteria for euthanasia does not necessitate
terminal or even physical illness, but instead grants permission based upon the constancy and
unbearableness of the patient’s suffering, be it physical or mental. The acting physician must also
determine that there are no other reasonable solutions (that the patient is willing to experiment
with) to the patient’s suffering. The vast majority of individuals being euthanized in these
countries are still terminally ill, but in addition to physical conditions that are not terminal such
as blindness (Trott, “Deaf Belgian twins end lives”), there has been a consistent increase in the
annual number of patients granted euthanasia who suffer from depression (clinical as well as
existential), anxiety, and other mental illnesses like eating disorders, PTSD, and body
dysmorphia (Boztas, “Netherlands Sees Sharp Increase”). This has drawn concern from mental
health and disability advocates in and outside of these countries who worry about the
vulnerability of these populations and the message it sends regarding society’s view of the lives
of the mentally ill.

The 1970's: Rachels, Brandt, and The Ethics of Suicide:
“Active and Passive Euthanasia” by James Rachels was a seminal piece of literature in
the euthanasia debate, which was published in 1975. Rachels was arguing against the belief that
passive euthanasia is morally superior to active euthanasia, which is a position that was and still
is endorsed by the American Medical Association. In the subtext of this argument is also an
argument about which cases warrant the granting of life-terminating actions by physicians.

Rachels starts with the following scenario “a patient who is dying of incurable cancer of
the throat is in terrible pain, which can no longer be satisfactorily alleviated. He is certain to die
within a few days, even if present treatment is continued” (Rachels, 1). Rachels then continues
to describe how, in the above scenario, said patient requests that life-prolonging treatment be
stopped, as the pain is too great, which is a request that the family supports. If the physician
agrees with this step and complies, the physician is participating in passive euthanasia. But, by
stopping life-prolonging treatment instead of administering a life-ending agent, “it may take the
patient longer to die, and so he may suffer more than he would if noire direct action were taken
and a lethal injection given” (2). While the initial request was granted based on the prevention of
suffering, if the active approach is abated, it leads to more suffering rather than less, which
subverts the humanitarian impulse that led to the decision in the first place.
Secondly, Rachels argues that the commitment to avoid “killing” (active) even in
situations where letting die is considered permissible leads to faulty decision-making regarding
life and death, stemming from our belief that it is always worse to kill than to let die. Rachels
gives examples of passive agents, with the desire to kill an individual, permitting that
individual’s death and, conversely, of an agent actively killing someone. Importantly, in all of
these examples, the subjects share murderous intent and are causally responsible regardless of
passive vs. active classifications. Both cases are morally reprehensible as they lead to the same
result. And in the same way, when the reason for facilitating a patient’s death is justified, passive
vs. active leads to the same result, and thus the passive approach is not superior. Lastly, Rachels
discusses a reason why the passive approach is preferred by her critics, which is that the passive
approach allows the doctor to not be directly responsible for the patient’s death. But Rachels
argues that they are still participating in the result through the passive model by withholding

treatment, so the difference is a shallow one, and that even if it is motivated for reasons of legal
protection, doctors should resist being accountable to a standard that is not morally defensible.
“The Morality and Rationality of Suicide” by Richard Brandt was published in 1975 and
is not specifically about euthanasia or PAS but highlights ethical considerations for selfannihilation which correspond with the contemporary context of Oregon and Belgium and the
Netherlands. In “The Morality and Rationality of Suicide”, Brandt analyzes the problem of
suicide from the lens of contemporary philosophy. He begins by assessing the morality of
suicide, or the relative blameworthiness of those who commit suicide. Even in situations where
the action of suicide is believed to be morally wrong, if the agent who commits suicide does so
because of a dominating affective state, can the individual really be considered morally
blameworthy? Brandt casts doubt on the notion that one can be blameworthy based solely on an
action, stating that blameworthiness resulting from an action is anchored by the notion that the
action stems from a character-deficiency, or that said action is a reflection of the individual’s
flawed character. But what character flaw is connected to suicide? Brandt also argues that
suicide could be motivated by positive traits, like dutifulness. This would mean that the agent’s
action does not warrant blame, even if the agent miscalculated the situation and shouldn’t have
committed suicide. For example, if a man committed suicide because he thought his medical bills
would bankrupt his family, and he was actually mistaken in that calculation, his actions were still
motivated by a positive trait and not a negative one such as cowardice, therefore he is not worthy
of moral blame.
After assessing the issue of blame, Brandt explores situations where suicide is morally
justified or objectively right. First, he explains that the critics of suicide must at least
acknowledge that the moral obligation to not kill oneself can come into contention with other

moral obligations in certain circumstances, problematizing unconditional moral prohibitions. For
example, if one had to sacrifice themselves for the sake of their families, there are two
contradictory obligations bearing weight on the situation. So, instead, the charitable view of
those who admonish suicide is to say that their position is that suicide is unacceptable when it is
based on one’s own personal welfare. Next, Brandt gives a defense of committing suicide if it is
in line with one’s welfare.
According to Brandt, if an individual would rather die shortly than continue living after
having considered the best possible “world course”, than it is rational for them to act on that
desire by terminating their life. To consider one’s world course, a person must imagine what it
would be like for their life to terminate at different points: now, in 5 years, in 20 years, and then
see which route is most desirable. He calls for the consideration of a world course instead of a
life course because the impact of the person’s death on the world is also considered. By “world”
Brandt means everything outside of one’s own life that they care about, such as their partner,
entire family, or community. Brandt explains that the person would need to meditate on their
answer to the world course question and not be in the middle of a particularly emotionally frantic
episode, so that it can be a rational as opposed to rash decision. By carefully considering world
courses, individuals may realize that the long-term scope of the entirety of their desires lend
themselves better to living longer, but, they may also not.
If an individual is to consider all the factors and meditate on the question of their ideal
time of death and it is still presently, than they are entitled to do so, according to Brandt. Brandt
answers the criticism of this position based on the unpredictability of the future, which is the
argument that a person who does not know what the future holds shouldn’t be able to terminate
their own life based on their feelings about the future. He argues that this argument could go both

ways and that anyone who has come to a reasoned conclusion could also say that the
unpredictability of the future rules in the favor of acting on their decision, because there is no
certainty that features of their world course will change drastically. Brandt directly
acknowledges individuals who are not terminally-ill and are instead depressed and no longer
wish to live. He argues that the above criteria still apply to these individuals, as long as they are
aware that depression has a tendency to limit our imagination, skew our reasoning abilities, and
curtail our motivation. He argues that irrational suicides are not the result of the influence of
factors like depression, but the compulsion towards a rash decision.
“Active and Passive Euthanasia” by James Rachels and “The Morality and Rationality of
Suicide” by Richard Brandt, both published in 1975, present two completely different
frameworks for the consideration of PAS/euthanasia. The respective arguments were geared
towards different audiences. Rachels was responding to the American Medical Association and
Brandt was contributing to a collection of essays about suicide, so it is not necessarily the case
that these two authors are in opposition or that their views could not be complementary, but
rather that the differences are notable in how they shed light on the distinctive ethical defenses of
terminating patients’ lives.
In “Active and Passive Euthanasia” by James Rachels, one can see the emergence of
PAS/active euthanasia defenses closely relate to what is still the standard in U.S Right to Die
states such as Oregon. At the time the article was published, there was no Right to Die states in
the U.S, but Rachels’ example still presented physical suffering in the face of a terminal-illness
with a closely impending death as the standard scenario warranting active, voluntary euthanasia,
and is therefore an early intellectual argument towards PAS. Though Oregon is a PAS state and
what Rachels details is active euthanasia, one can assume that the author would find both

scenarios morally justified, as PAS is still more “active” than passive euthanasia. Though
personal agency is highlighted in that the patient initiated the request to cease life-prolonging
treatment, the scenario made sure to express the family’s acceptance and the physician’s
uncomplicated and obvious approval, putting the brunt of the proposed actions’ defense on
humanitarianism in the face of terminal and physical suffering instead of personal liberty.
Conversely, “The Morality and Rationality of Suicide” proposes a model that closely
resembles what is legislated in Belgium and the Netherlands. In both countries, it is required that
the individual undergo a process and waits out a trial period to discuss their motivations with a
skilled professional and have their desire approved based on the unbearableness and constancy of
their qualms. While this, on its face, presents more obstructions than Brandt’s world-course
consideration process proposes, the subjectivity of “unbearableness” essentially puts the onus on
the individual to assess the implications of their suffering, namely if it is severe enough that they
don’t wish to bear it any longer via continuing their lives. It is a subjective form of suffering in
that it is not biologically terminal -- it doesn’t necessitate that the person will die in the same way
suffering from a terminal disease will, where the suffering is merely a secondary characteristic of
what their PAS/active euthanasia is actually granted based upon, such as with the case of
Oregon.
In conclusion of this segment of the literature review, Brandt determines that a suicide is
rational and therefore ethical if it is the result of principled consideration, which puts personal
liberty and agency far above the argument in Rachels’ article. Brandt’s arguments corresponds to
the cases of The Netherlands and Belgium more directly, as The Netherlands and Belgium both
require that the decision not be rash and have a process in place to guarantee that the request is
sustained, while also prioritizing the patient’s own perception of their life-course once it is

determined to be a stable request. Still, Brandt’s argument is about suicide, and while voluntary
euthanasia is a form of suicide, in this context, it has the added component of endorsement by
and participation from the state via the medical institution. It is possible that Brandt would agree
that it is an individual’s morally justified human and civil right, but that it shouldn’t involve the
collaboration of either the medical community and/or the state via legislation.
At the time both of these arguments were written, the euthanasia debate had just begun in
both related regions, and it would be another 10 years before legislation would begin to
formulate in The Netherlands and Belgium (Deliens et al, “The euthanasia law in Belgium and
the Netherlands”). In the United States, the AMA still holds that active euthanasia is
unacceptable, demonstrated by the following statement directly from the AMA website:
“Euthanasia is fundamentally incompatible with the physician’s role as healer, would be difficult
or impossible to control, and would pose serious societal risks. Euthanasia could readily be
extended to incompetent patients and other vulnerable populations” (“Code of Medical Ethics”).
The question of the role of the medical institution is where contemporary literature can add
clarification, as the appropriate role of the medical and/or psychiatric institution within these
modes of end-of-life action, especially outside of the scope of terminal illness, is a contemporary
point of contention in ethical and bioethical discourse, with both models existing in the
international legislative landscape.

De Haan, Varelius, and Autonomy:
Jurriaan De Haan details his position on the rightful role of autonomy in euthanasia in his
article "The ethics of euthanasia: Advocates’ perspectives”, which was published in 2002. This
was a time when only the Netherlands had fully legalized active, voluntary euthanasia. De

Haan’s article has significance in that it is very well circulated in its field and often referenced
within contemporary euthanasia discourse.
De Haan begins by praising euthanasia practices in the Netherlands, explaining that
euthanasia is granted based upon both the patient’s voluntary choice, as well as the
unbearableness of their suffering. Therefore, the current law is invested in physicians respecting
individual autonomy, but also pursues the patient’s benefit. The reasoning contained within this
criterion can also be described as a joint view of anatomy, because it requires both autonomy and
the doctor’s unique discretion to permit euthanasia. De Haan argues that, while the law itself
acknowledges that euthanasia is outside of a doctor’s normal medical duty, physicians can still
weigh in due to their status as collaborators to the act and the agent within the patient-doctor
dynamic who possess medical knowledge as well as, ideally, knowledge of the patient’s own
values regarding life and suffering. The author argues that doctors inevitability play this role
throughout their medical practice because there are constantly matters that are both subjective
yet lend themselves to a doctor’s unique medical insight within their practice. So, in conjunction
with the first requirement of the joint view, it is possible and necessary that a doctor’s pursuit of
the patient’s best interest be involved in euthanasia.
But there is also the pure autonomy view, which argues that autonomy in and of itself
justifies euthanasia. Specifically, the pure autonomy view argues that “euthanasia is morally
justified just because of the patient's voluntary, well-considered and sustained, that is
autonomous, request for euthanasia” (156). Therefore, according to this view, the only
gatekeeping a physician would reasonably perform is to make sure that the patient is of their
right mind and is not being rash, similarly to the argument generated by Brandt presented in
1975. But according to De Haan, this view leads to counter-intuitive results, where any reason to

pursue death is given a stamp of approval as long as it is representative of the patient’s will,
since doctors will not be encouraged to weigh in with judgements regarding if their pain or
suffering warrants death or not. He also goes on to discuss the risks to the integrity of the
medical community if doctors are to collaborate in instances where the suffering is not
unbearable, as it can lead to charges of maleficence. The value of autonomy does not justify
euthanasia on its own as euthanasia is not self-regarding, but instead affects society in numerous
ways.
In biomedical philosopher Jukka Varelius’ essay "Illness, suffering and voluntary
euthanasia” published in 2007, the author examines the belief that suffering due to illness or
suffering at all must be present for euthanasia to be a viable option, arguing that there is no
“good reason” for this tradition. According to Varelius, a person who desires euthanasia for
reasons outside of terminal illness or even suffering should be granted their request, as these
categories of “bad things” are not the only “bad things” that could reasonably lead to the
sustained desire to die in an autonomous being. First, the author questions the proposition that
only one who is suffering may rationally desire death, stating that “one may be in pain, but not
suffer; one's desires may remain dissatisfied without this being connected to suffering; one may
be deprived of liberty, but not suffer”. Here, Varelius is addressing the fact that some people
regard “suffering”, in the sense of being in pain or facing hardships, as ultimately desirable
because they believe it gives life meaning, whether spiritually and/or through building character.
Thus, in the same vein that someone who is ill may not “suffer” as such, another person may
forgo suffering but still find themselves lacking the desire to continue living, whether for social,
political, or existential reasons. The individual could be tired of living or have continuous
feelings of uselessness, for example. The author also provides the example of a man who is

given a choice by a dictatorial government to either end his own life or have his whole family
killed, and because he values being a national hero above all else, decides to ask his friend to
assist him in ending his own life.
Some would argue that the above example is not applicable to active, voluntary
euthanasia laws because the individual’s life has been compromised by a corrupt government
instead of their own suffering and the immediate threat is on his family and not on his own
quality of life. But the author argues that euthanasia should not only apply in cases of suffering,
but in all situations that are inescapable in the sense that death would be the only possible way of
avoiding whatever they subjectively believe renders life undesirable to continue living. Varelius
anticipates the criticism that a physician’s intervention is not applicable in cases were physical
suffering is not at stake, arguing that physicians are not only tasked with ending suffering, but
empowering patient’s autonomy in all biomedical matters. According to Varelius, euthanasia is
appropriate in all cases where the act is a benefit for the dying person in the sense that it would
help her to avoid something bad in her life that can’t be solved otherwise and that she wants to
avoid enough that dying is her decision.
Varelius then goes onto interact with the position of Jurriaan De Haan and the role of
autonomy in his argument. De Haan credits the Netherlands for including the clause of
unbearable suffering because it anchors the approval or denial of euthanasia requests in the realm
of medical knowledge and wisdom, as opposed to pure autonomy, which he argues leads to
counter-intuitive results granting justificatory power to requests for euthanasia irrespective of
whether or not they are good or bad decisions. Conversely, Varelius defends the position that
there is room for an operating standard within euthanasia criteria beyond autonomy even if that
standard is not “suffering”, as there are other states or factors that could cause an autonomous

person to reasonably desire the escape of death. She also argues that people who do hold to a
pure autonomy view most likely do not believe there can’t be good or bad reasons for euthanasia,
but that those reasons are determined subjectively on the basis of “preferences and attitudes of
favor and disfavor of autonomous agents”.
When comparing Jukka Varelius’ essay "Illness, suffering and voluntary euthanasia” and
Juriaan De Haan "The ethics of euthanasia: Advocates’ perspectives”, earlier noted philosophical
strategies, values, and investments are brought into clarity in the PAS/active, voluntary
euthanasia literature, as well as different points of contention in the contemporary ethical and
legal landscape. As in the case of Rachels and Brandt’s arguments, the ratio of agency and
autonomy vs. management of physical suffering play telling roles. One factor to note is that
while De Haan’s article is in praise of The Netherlands, the argument itself does not necessarily
put his position on the side of The Netherland and Belgium’s criteria for PAS/active euthanasia
vs. the Right to Die model exemplified in Oregon. While he doesn’t ground his reliance on the
concept of suffering in physical suffering or generalized suffering due to a physical and/or
terminal illness, his elevation of the doctor’s role in exercising medically-pertinent discretion
causes one to wonder what he would think of the more contemporary, and currently multiplying,
cases involving more complicated notions of suffering, as this article was written in 2002.
While euthanasia in Belgium and The Netherlands require participation and approval
from medical doctors, in the cases of existential depression and mental illnesses, medical doctors
do not have the ability to say that treatment has truly been exhausted or that the person’s
condition will necessarily worsen or deteriorate over time, as existential and psychological
suffering due to mental illness or anguish is not as readily measurable in the way a terminal
illness is. Thus, they must appeal to the patient’s freedom of choice and insight into their own

condition. This is not to say that mental illness is not as excruciating or severe as a terminal
illness, but that the kind of assessment a medical doctor could perform on the patient’s situation
would not be as insightful, something reflected in the lack of restrictions beyond persistency of
request and the perception of the unbearable nature of their reported suffering. Arguably, The
Netherland and Belgium’s approach to euthanasia is required to rely more heavily on autonomy
than De Haan seems comfortable with, and that his model would fit more with the case of
Oregon contemporarily, where the patient’s best interest can be qualified by a physician if they
autonomously decide to respond to their suffering with the option of terminating their life.
Conversely, Varelius does not require that individuals who do not wish to continue their
life suffer in the way that is comparable to the standard narrative surrounding those who qualify
to be euthanized. She argues that the wave of philosophers stressing individual autonomy in
biomedical ethics promotes the view that the proper goals of medicine are ultimately determined
by the autonomous decision of a patient, so that euthanasia can be performed in the name of
promoting a patient’s wellbeing or because it is their sustained desire given their life
circumstances. To demonstrate the connection to Belgium and The Netherlands’ approach to
PAS/active euthanasia criteria, Wim Distelman, who was appointed by the Belgian Council of
Ministers to serve as the chairman of the Federal Control and Evaluation Commision (the
committee which reviews euthanasia deaths to insure that doctors have complied with the law),
stated the following in regards to the “incurable” clause in the legislation: “We at the
commission are confronted more and more with patients who are tired of dealing with a sum of
small ailments—they are what we call ‘tired of life [...] If you ask for euthanasia because you are
alone, and you are alone because you don’t have family to take care of you, we cannot create
family” (The Death Treatment, Aviv). Distelman is one of the most liberal practitioners of

euthanasia, who pushes the envelope in regards to a suffering individual’s autonomy. While
these countries still exercise discretion over what they consider reasonably incurable, Varelius’
autonomy-heavy approach certainly fits in more with Distelmans words than Oregon’s Right to
Die movement, which necessitates terminal illness.
These two articles demonstrate the opposing contemporary views on the proper role of
the medical community within the gamut of end of life choices. While De Haan advocates for the
role of the medical doctor in PAS/euthanasia, it is as a gatekeeper who uses her medical
knowledge and professional discretion to weigh the patient’s autonomy against the objective
“badness” or “goodness” of their death to determine if it is reasonable and/or medically justified.
Varelius also includes the medical doctor in her proposal, but with the view of the doctor as
facilitator of bioethical justice, with her calculation of bioethical justice prioritizing personal
agency and autonomy as opposed to a figure who is to discern what sort of bad situations warrant
death, as long as these bad situations are ones that the patient reasonably believes are
unavoidable. She argues that those who are suffering due to terminal illness should not have
monopoly over the granting of PAS/euthanasia, as those are not the only situations that are
“terminal” in their reasonably perceived hopelessness.

Conclusion:
In conclusion, through this survey of literatures from two different eras in biomedical and
philosophical development, we can see the emergence of two distinctive branches in the
PAS/active, voluntary euthanasia debate. One area where the two models of criteria diverge is
the balance between autonomy and humanitarian-relief of suffering, as well as the justification
for termination of life facilitated by medical doctors.
One can see that the correct notion of suffering is a loaded question within this debate,

which calls for further philosophical examination. In the Right to Die states, while release from
suffering is part of the defense, it is not enough on its own. The language of dignity takes
precedence over the notion of agency, and both are rooted in the end-of-life landscape uniquely,
“adding a voluntary option to the continuum of end-of-life care, these laws give patients dignity,
control, and peace of mind during their final days with family and loved ones”, as stated by the
Death with Dignity non-profit in the U.S, which has played a pivotal role in advocating for PAS
legislation throughout the movements history (“Death with Dignity Acts”).
In the Right to Die states like Oregon, the role of autonomy and relief of suffering are
limited to the end-of-life landscape, leaving less room for ambiguity in the quality and nature of
the patient’s suffering -- as it must be due to a terminal illness. This is arguably beneficial in that
it maintains the integrity of the medical doctor in collaborating in a patient’s death, given the
ambiguity of unbearable or constant suffering as the main criteria. Suffering is a secondary to the
patient’s status of terminally-ill in Right to Die states. It is one argument for why the terminallyill should be able to make their own decisions when the quality of their life is already verifiably
compromised, but it is not the only reason. Beyond escaping pain, Death with Dignity advocates
highlight personal agency and control over their own impending death. But can the same
principles that allow one to hasten their impending death be applied to individuals who are not
terminally-ill without compromising the medical institution?
In Varelius’ and even Brandt’s calculations, one can see a model where the doctors role is
to safeguard in a more liberal way, making sure that the person is not delusional or temporarily
in a heightened emotional state in their subjective calculation, and that their problem is
unsolvable from their perspective. This begs the following question and investigation: what is the
proper role of the medical doctor within the realm of decision-making regarding the termination

of life that is not terminal, and therefore already in the realm of end of life care. As far as the role
of her credentials and expertise, is the involvement of the medical actor even appropriate or
logical? If not the medical institution, is there a body within the state that should be regulating
this activity, or should assisted-suicide and euthanasia only be legalized in the face of terminal
illness, as it requires a level of conviction in the relative goodness or badness of collaborating in
a death that doesn’t exist? In 2016, The American Psychiatric Association released the following
statement regarding the euthanasia of non-terminally ill patients: “The American Psychiatric
Association [...] holds that a psychiatrist should not prescribe or administer any intervention to a
non-terminally ill person for the purpose of causing death” (“Position Statement on Medical
Euthanasia”). While autonomy is a value that should be promoted in health care, the proscription
against helping psychiatric patients to commit suicide is too integral to the ethos of the medical
field to transition to a pure autonomy model. While psychiatrists may be the actors within the
contemporary umbrella of health care with the most authority on the subject, their collaboration
may do more harm than good.
Though other life conditions besides terminal illness cannot be proven to produce a lesser
quantity of suffering, the quality of the suffering differs in that it is not due to terminal illness
and is therefore outside of the scope of end-of-life care, making the future quality of the given
life subject to termination unpredictable. Someone may make this argument in the case of
terminal illness, as medical discoveries could render the person’s illness no longer terminal. But
in reality, medical advances are slow, and doctors can speak to the patient’s state with more
authority. This is an important element in maintaining the integrity of the acting medical
professional, as the lack of authority to weigh-in meaningfully with their given expertise makes
it inappropriate for them to weigh-in so decisively on the relative quality of a life marked with

suffering. Here, one can see how models which rely on a humanitarian end-of-life approach are
not likely to evolve into what is permissible in The Netherlands and Belgium without
considerable reconstruction, as their preliminary parameters are objective and rely less on the
patient’s personal assessment. Though they account for suffering, they are not based on
suffering, whether physical or psychological. The Netherlands and Belgium also require that
medical doctors exercise discretion in permitting or disallowing euthanasia, but because
euthanasia can be granted based on forms of existential suffering and mental and psychological
illness that cannot be decisively or objectively labelled as untreatable, therapeutically-futile or
“terminal”, the countries rely too heavily on the individual’s autonomy to be safeguarded by
medical doctors based on their expertise. This is made apparent in that the suffering has to be
constant and/or unbearable, which are subjective markers reliant on self-reporting as opposed to
medical science.
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